Inside a 40-foot shipping container from the United States, falsely declared as personal effects, were nine pistols, eight assault rifles, and 219 rounds of live ammunition. The discovery first announced by the Ghana Revenue Authority, was not just a smuggling bust but a window into a deeper, more systematic problem: the persistent attempts by criminal networks to arm violent groups in Ghana.

Four years on, the investigation shows that the weapons shipment which were concealed beneath rice and household goods in blue barrels, originated from the Port of Baltimore, Maryland, and was linked to Kojo Owusu Dartey, a U.S. Army Major stationed in North Carolina.

According to court indictment documents reviewed as part of this investigation, Kojo Owusu Dartey, orchestrated this scheme with the aid of Staff Sergeant George Archer and others. The indictment noted that these individuals knowingly violated Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(a)(1)(A) and 924 by engaging in unlicensed firearms dealing and illegally exporting weapons without a license.

U.S. federal authorities later prosecuted Dartey, securing a jury conviction in April 2024 on charges of smuggling firearms without an export license, making false statements to federal agencies, and dealing in firearms without a license. He was sentenced to 70 months in prison in February 2025.

The Ghana Police Service did not respond to a right to information request on possible conspirators in Ghana as part of the September 2021 weapons seizure.

The Attorney General’s office and the Ministry of Interior in Ghana did not respond to a right of reply request and a further request to provide status update on sixteen other cases involving major firearms seizures, diversions and arrests in the last five years in Ghana.

Infographic below:

“These weapons were likely destined for groups like violent groups in Bawku, or criminal networks,” says top national security source who spoke to us on condition of anonymity.

That pattern of opacity, and silence by the state has only fuelled a climate of impunity, enabling the very smuggling networks and violent actors the state purports to be combating.

“The big people (government officials) themselves are involved in the criminal networks that facilitate arms networks,” said security analyst Professor Kwesi Aning.

Ghana is noted as a supplier of weapons in West Africa to criminal networks. Despite no evidence that the weapons seized at the Tema port was intended for violent extremist groups, several reports have shown how Ghana’s underground artisanal firearm sector end up supporting conflicts internally and within West Africa.

According to a 2020 Small Arms Survey’s report “, Ghanaian gunsmiths are able to produce semi-automatic or automatic weapons, including copies that closely resemble factory-made counterparts such as locally made copies of AK-pattern assault rifles referred to as ‘washman’ capable of single-shot or automatic fire (with a standard 30-round magazine), as well as copies of Russian, Chinese, North Korean, Libyan, and Serbian versions of the world-renowned Soviet AK-47 automatic assault rifles.

Another report by Small Arms Survey titled: Trafficking and smuggling in the Burkina Faso– Côte d’ivoire–Mali region  also noted Ghana is a source of black-market explosives and arms trafficked into the tri-border region via routes like Bondoukou–Bouna–Varale–Doropo and through Burkina Faso’s Pô and Zabré entry points. These “ants trade” smuggling operations using motorcycles and concealed cargo supply extremist groups in Mali and Burkina Faso.

In April, 2025, the Ghana police announced it had intercepted 33,000 ammuni­tion packed in 132 boxes concealed in an Accra–Be­nin bound Hyundai bus during a routine inspection.

This is “very concerning” said the national security official. “The state must thoroughly investigate to identify the powerful people behind this.”

Ghana finds itself at a crossroads: either plug the gaping movement of arms within its own borders or risk becoming the next front in a widening regional war.

In July 2025, Ghana’s late Defence Minister, Omane Boamah, made troubling disclosures about lapses in ammunition control. “I have disclosed that in 2024, there was an incident of ammunition moving from the Ghana Armed Forces to the National Security in 2024. As we speak, the National Security Secretariat under President Mahama is investigating the movement of ammunition,” he stated.

He added: “Beyond that particular case is another one that we have uncovered, that prior to the 2024 incident, there was also theft of ammunition within the Ghana Armed Forces.

“I am raising this because such ammunitions find their way into the hands of people who are not well trained and have ulterior motives.”

“In a region where armed groups feed off weak institutions and smuggled weapons, the inability to fully prosecute arms trafficking cases is a national security failure of the highest order,” said the national security official.

“Weapons (two cases above) like these don’t just disappear. Someone is arming someone. And we may not want to admit it, but that ‘someone’ could be right across our borders or already within them,” he added.

Failure of the state to aggressively prosecute some previous weapons smuggling cases and related arrests is stark warning of how Ghana, long a beacon of stability in West Africa, can be drawn into the deadly orbit of violent extremist groups.

Jihadist groups and a family’s escape from terror

According to a 2024 report by the Dutch think tank the Clingendael Institute, Ghana’s northern frontier stretching about 500 kilometers along Burkina Faso’s volatile south has become a conduit for supplies, recruits, and safe havens that sustain jihadist insurgencies.

The report further notes that the absence of direct attacks on Ghanaian soil appears to be a calculated decision: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is avoiding disruptions to these critical supply chains and refraining from provoking Ghana’s relatively capable security forces — at least for now.

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is a militant Islamist group operating across the Sahel, linked to al-Qaeda and active in insurgencies in Mali, Burkina Faso, and neighboring countries.

Meanwhile, at the Zini Refugee Camp near Ghana’s northwestern border with Burkina Faso, the effects of this growing crisis are on full display.

In the refugee camp, a dusty outpost in Ghana’s upper west region, Hajiratu, a 32-year-old mother of four, sits under a tarp, her eyes heavy with grief. Years ago, in Fada N’Gourma, Burkina Faso, JNIM militants stormed her home at dusk.

“They fired guns, took my husband, blindfolded him with his shirt, and dragged him away,” she recalls, her voice trembling. “Those who resisted were killed on the spot.”

Now among 867 refugees in Zini, a camp established in April 2024, Hajiratu grapples with an uncertain future. Just recently, 46 new arrivals from Kayaa and Pissila in Burkina Faso joined her, fleeing similar ultimatums: “convert to Islam or die,” they said.

Asata, another refugee, shares a parallel agony. Her brother was abducted by Fulbe militants, his fate unknown. “I see his terror-filled eyes every night,” she says.

“Is he alive, forced to fight, or dead?”

Such personal horrors underscore the impact of Sahel’s jihadist violence into Ghana, where porous borders allow not just militants but also the displaced to cross freely.

These accounts, gathered when journalist, Gideon Sarpong visited the camp, reflect the Sahel’s spiralling violence, with over 110,000 displaced to Northern Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire since October 2024, according to UNHCR.

The camp offers fragile safety, but food shortages and education gaps exacerbated by a shift from food aid to cash stipends leave refugees like Hajiratu and Asata dependent on dwindling support, dreaming of farmlands to rebuild their lives.

Bawku: A Tinderbox at the Border, border challenges & violent extremist groups

Just 30 kilometers from Burkina Faso, the town of Bawku simmers on the edge of collapse. A long-standing ethnic conflict between the Mamprusi and Kusasi communities has escalated into a full-blown armed standoff, transforming this north eastern outpost into one of Ghana’s most volatile frontiers.

CONTEXT: The Mamprusi, descendants of a centralized kingdom tracing roots to the 17th century and known for their warrior traditions, claim historical chieftaincy over Bawku based on providing military aid to local groups against invaders. The Kusasi, who assert indigenous status as the area’s original inhabitants, maintain a traditionally acephalous society led by earth priests (tendaanas) rather than chiefs, and view the Mamprusi as newcomers imposed by colonial British policies favoring centralized structures for indirect rule. At its core, the dispute dating back to the early 20th century and exacerbated by post-independence political meddling revolves around land ownership, chieftaincy rights, and ethnic dominance. This has fueled cycles of violence that have killed hundreds and displaced thousands.

The deeper reality, however, is that insecurity in these areas has reached such heights that even access has become perilous. Journalists working on this investigation were unable to travel to key border communities in Ghana’s Upper East Region due to a recent spike in attacks on commercial vehicles along the Bolgatanga–Bawku–Pulmakom corridor.

The situation has grown so dire that Ghana’s own Inspector General of Police came under fire during a recent visit, with one officer injured in the ambush. In June 2025, President John Mahama publicly called on the military to guarantee safe passage for all passengers regardless of ethnic affiliation and goods along the route, which is a stark admission of how compromised state security has become in parts of the country.

“Now the police are almost not in the major conflict zones in the northern region; it is only the armed forces that are left. That is how serious a trouble we are in,” said Professor Kwesi Aning.

Meanwhile, at the Hamile border post in the Upper West Region, immigration officers, speaking on condition of anonymity, described an unsettling reality: dozens of unmonitored crossing points emerge during the dry season, when, as one officer put it, “every route becomes a potential crossing.” Surveillance systems are broken or non-existent, and officials lack the basic tools to control movement. “Some people just pass through. We can’t track them, we don’t even see them,” one said.

This vulnerability exploded into violence on September 13, 2025, when irate youth, fueled by accusations that an immigration officer aided armed gunmen from Burkina Faso to cross into Ghana and wrongfully attempted to deport a refugee woman, rampaged through the post setting a vehicle ablaze, burning tires, vandalizing the office, and even leading to the tragic collapse and death of a bystander amid the chaos.

Such eruptions not only shatter fragile community trust but underscore the dire urgency of bolstering border security.

“Ghana has not invested in its borders since 1951 and if you go to any border towns, we have no equipment. Even if we claim there is a security problem, our behaviour and investment do not reflect any insecurity,” Aning added. “It is the quality of training that we give to the border officials, the equipment that are available and a general security strategy that says we see borders as more of zones of engagement and deepening relations and as zones of crime and threat.”

Ghana’s immediate past ambassador to Burkina Faso, Boniface Gambila Adagbila, offered a rare public acknowledgment of the threat. “Believe it or not, they [extremists] are able to come into Ghana and go back,” he said in a recent interview. “They move in and go back… They roam, they come to our hospitals and go back.”

This quiet infiltration appears to extend well beyond the borderlands, reaching deep into the country’s urban centers.

“Yes, porous borders can potentially be a problem. Ghana has been a facilitator of violence and criminal networks in West Africa over the last 30 years,” said Professor Aning.

“Terrorists don’t need to come here we go to them because of the criminal networks that are here and because of the level of collusion between state officials and these criminal gangs otherwise ask yourself why should galamsey (illegal small scale mining) be allowed to thrive.”

A 2023 report by Small Arms Survey noted Ghana as a key source of diverted commercial explosives feeding jihadist networks in the Sahel, where “baguette”-style dynamite from its mining sector has been traced to artisanal sites in Burkina Faso and Mali controlled by JNIM.

“Ghana remains the preferred location for the sale of stolen or confiscated firearms,” Gideon Ofosu-Peasah, an analyst with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC) wrote in a recent article. “JNIM is rumoured to have numerous meeting points and hideouts on the Ghanaian side of the borders with Togo and Burkina Faso.”

The porousness is not incidental, it is structural. A 2023 report by Promediation warns that Ghana’s proximity to Burkina Faso’s Cascades region and northern Côte d’Ivoire has made its northern corridor an attractive fallback zone for armed groups. The report estimates that between 200 and 300 Ghanaian youths have already been recruited into extremist groups linked to JNIM operating in and around the northern borders.

In June 2021, Abu Dujana, a Ghanaian Fulani, carried out a JNIM suicide bombing in Mali, urging attacks in Ghana in a chilling video. Targeting his kinsmen in Karaga, Northern Region, he exploited ethnic tensions and economic desperation.

Democracy and governance analyst R. Maxwell Bone cautions, that unless the militarized approach is replaced with one that prioritizes addressing the social exclusion rendering communities vulnerable to violent extremist recruitment, the security situation will continue to deteriorate.

Way forward

Since 2000, the Bawku conflict has claimed hundreds of lives, displaced at least 2,500 residents, and destroyed over 200 homes, according to a 2024 report published by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Over 80 people have been killed since 2024 as a result of the conflict.

But the deeper concern lies in how Bawku’s chaos may be drawing the attention and presence of jihadist actors operating in Burkina Faso’s Cascades region. Ghana’s former President, Nana Akufo-Addo, did not mince words in his 2024 State of the Nation Address, calling Bawku a “wasteland of destruction and distrust,” adding, “what should concern all of us and not just the people of Bawku is that, in its current state, Bawku is an alluring magnet to mischief makers and extremists operating a few kilometers across from the border.”

Recent incidents point to the creeping militarization of the Bawku area and expansion into other areas in Ghana. Two male students of Nalerigu Senior High School were shot and killed following a violent attack by unidentified gunmen in July, 2025 believed to be linked to the Bawku conflict.

On the ground, the fear is palpable. “What’s worrying is that you have youth openly brandishing rifles young boys moving with weapons they shouldn’t have,” said Mohammed, a prominent youth leader in Bawku. (His name has been changed to protect his identity.) “Just a few days ago, they stopped a water truck from entering town near the police station. That’s how bold it’s become.”

Mohammed described a town under siege, not just by its own tensions but by a deepening sense of abandonment. “It’s very difficult to get food into Bawku. I need military escort just to travel to Bolgatanga. We are all suffering. We just keep appealing to ourselves to stop, but nothing changes.”

What fuels the conflict, he said, isn’t just old grudges it’s money, ideology, and a steady flow of arms. “The whole conflict has been radicalized. People use all their resources to support it. I know residents from outside Bawku who buy weapons and send them hidden in Land Cruisers. The guns come from cities in the south. And the quantity here is scary. People fire all night and never run out.”

Despite no conclusive record of jihadist groups’ participation in the Bawku conflict, Mohammed’s fears go beyond local dynamics. “With the jihadist situation, I wouldn’t be surprised if some people from Bawku are involved. There’s a perception that both sides have links to jihadists. I doubt it’s widespread, but you can’t rule it out.”

His warning is echoed by Sadik, a fellow youth leader, who insists not just the widespread arming of civilians, but also the role of external funding in sustaining the violence. (His name has been changed to protect his identity.)

The conditions are eerily familiar to Dr. Kaderi Noagah Bukari, a senior research fellow and Head of Department of Peace Studies at the University of Cape Coast who has mapped the evolution of armed civilian groups along Ghana’s northern borders.

“Kwelugu, for instance, is home to several armed groups formed mainly by Kusasi communities,” he said. “Originally set up to combat cattle rustling, they now resemble vigilantes very much like the armed self-defense groups operating in Burkina Faso.”

Bukari warned of a widening security vacuum. “There are ungoverned spaces in northern Ghana,” he said. “The absence of sustained state presence has allowed these groups to entrench themselves.”

While Bukari was cautious about drawing direct links between Bawku’s factions and jihadist groups like JNIM or ISIS-Sahel, he was unequivocal about the danger.

“The region is heavily weaponised. Most of the arms come from within Ghana, from major cities in the south. And when you combine that level of armament with longstanding grievances and a culture of impunity, it becomes a powder keg. Vulnerabilities like this are exactly what extremists look for.”

For Professor Aning, the most threatening contribution to insecurity in Ghana is the “human factor.”

“The inability or incapacity of those mandated by law and the constitution to provide the protection,” he explained. “The sum total of the security challenges facing the country calls into question the effectiveness and the competence of public officials who are dealing with the compounding security challenges. We need a different approach.”

Report by Gideon Sarpong.

The post Ghana’s quiet crisis: Bawku, smuggling and the extremist war next door appeared first on iWatch Africa.

Afua Poma, whose trading operation was revealed in the investigative report, was found with three newly captured sea turtles in her possession at the time of her arrest, underscoring the urgency of the crisis.

The captured turtles were released back into the ocean after evidence was gathered. In a bid for leniency, Poma pleaded with the police, saying, “I am sorry about this action. Please forgive me.  I will not practice this illegal trade again.”

Poma’s arrest marks a significant step in the fight against illegal sea turtle poaching in Ghana, but her alleged partner, Kweku Essien, remains at large. The authorities are continuing their search for Essien, a key player in the illicit trade.

The police have formally charged Afua Poma with illegal possession and trade of protected species under Ghana’s Wildlife Resources Management Act 115, 2023, and she will be arraigned according to the head of the crime unit, ASP Francis Kumi.

Head of Nyanyano’s crime unit, ASP Francis Kumi, also issued a stern warning, reminding the public that the hunting, capture, and trade of sea turtles is strictly prohibited under Ghana’s Wildlife Resources Management Act 1115 (2023), which carries penalties of up to two years in prison or substantial fines for violators.

Gideon Sarpong, whose investigation ignited this crackdown, expressed satisfaction with the swift law enforcement action, stating, “As investigative journalists, our role goes beyond simply telling the story—we strive to spark change. The arrest of Afua Poma following our report is a powerful reminder that shedding light on injustice can lead to real-world action. It’s a victory not just for the sea turtles, but for the entire ocean ecosystem they sustain.”

Read more about the investigation here: The vanishing guardians of Ghana’s oceans: Exposing the sea turtle poaching crisis

Sea turtles are critical to the health of Ghana’s marine ecosystems.

The original investigation was produced in partnership with the Pulitzer Center’s Ocean Reporting Network.  Report by Gideon Sarpong.

The post Impact: Ghana police arrest sea turtle trader after iWatch Africa investigation appeared first on iWatch Africa.

Nyanyano, Ghana — In an open, unsanitary seaside shed in Nyanyano, a coastal town in Ghana’s Central Region, eight massive sea turtles lie helpless under the blazing sun, their shells baking in the heat. Flipped on their backs to prevent escape, these ancient guardians of the marine ecosystem struggle weakly in the filth, their long flippers, designed for graceful swimming, now flap weakly against the harsh conditions surrounding them. Overhead, the sun blazes on, unaware of the grim fate awaiting these Olive Ridleys.

Standing nearby, Kweku Essien, a sea turtle trader, is unapologetic about his illegal business. He openly buys sea turtles from poachers and local fishers, profiting from the dwindling populations of one of the ocean’s most majestic species. Scattered around the shed, journalists also discovered the shells of previously slaughtered turtles, underscoring the grim reality of Essien’s operation and the severity of the problem.

“I sell the large turtles for 500 [$40] cedis each,” he revealed to iWatch Africa’s undercover team. The team watches as Essien proudly gestures to the captured turtles and a nearby slaughterhouse.

“We will kill all of them and transport them to the market in Mankessim [a nearby town] if we do not get buyers by the beginning of the closed fishing season on Monday.”

“We also have customers who come with their own means of transportation to buy them alive. They need to be sold quickly—after a week, they will die. These ones [turtles] have already been here for four days,” he said casually, flipping one of the massive Olive Ridleys onto its belly to show the journalists it’s still alive. 

“We can also transport it to your choice of location,” he added.

Essien is far from alone in the turtle poaching business. His partner, known in the community as “Maame Turtle [Mother Turtle],” has been involved in the trade for several years, building a reputation in the illegal market.

The casual admission to journalists about their illegal trade highlights the grim reality: the illegal trade in sea turtles is thriving, despite international and local laws aimed at protecting them. In Ghana, where economic hardship drives fishers to seek quick profit, these majestic creatures have become victims in the relentless quest for survival.

The investigation also uncovered more captured sea turtles around Nyanyano, caught by fishers and awaiting the same grim fate. This paints a sobering picture of the ongoing poaching crisis, showing just how perilous the situation is for sea turtles in Ghana.

A struggling economy and a desperate Trade

In Ghana’s coastal waters, the primary nesting season for sea turtles—Olive Ridley, Leatherback, and Green—runs from September through February. According to Dr. Andrews Agyekumhene, a marine scientist from the University of Ghana, Olive Ridleys are the most commonly observed species. 

Olive Ridley nesting sites in Ghana are considered as “major” due to the high nesting density according to a 2020 report by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) SSC Marine Turtle Specialist Group.

However, a 2021 research paper co-authored by Dr Agyekumhene revealed a shocking decline in nesting activity in some parts of Ghana—a 46% drop since the peak in 2013.

The IUCN red list, categorizes six of the seven marine turtle species as Vulnerable, Endangered, or Critically Endangered globally with Leatherback and Olive Ridley turtles listed as “Vulnerable” on a global scale.

“For years, these turtles have returned to our shores, only to find fewer safe places to nest,” Dr. Agyekumhene told iWatch Africa. His research points to human activity as the main culprit.

“All seven species of sea turtles are globally threatened with extinction due to a range of anthropogenic sources of mortality,” he adds. 

But in Ghana, the illegal poaching and sale of sea turtles, like those in Essien’s shed, represent “one of the gravest threats” to their survival.

The sea turtles Essien sells are often captured by local fishers like Okyeame Kwesi Atta, who face a difficult choice between adhering to the law and providing for their families.

Kwesi admitted to the iWatch Africa team: “When we get enough money from fishing, we won’t be tempted to engage in illegal activities, but when times are hard, and a turtle is caught in the net, we sell it. I can get 300 cedis [$20] for one.” 

For Kwesi and others like him, the temptation is too great. Despite knowing the sea turtles’ importance to the ecosystem and the legends that surround them—some communities even worship turtles as gods—the economic pressures of daily life override reverence.

“We have been told not to poach sea turtles,” Kwesi admits. “But the sea turtles are always there. We can’t ignore them when we are struggling to catch fish to feed our families.”

The loss of sea turtles has far-reaching consequences for Ghana’s coastal waters. According to the Sea Turtle Conservancy, an international sea turtle research and conservation group, sea turtles play a crucial role in maintaining marine ecosystems by grazing on seagrass, which helps keep seagrass beds healthy and supports a wide range of marine life.

Dr. Agyekumhene has also spent years researching how sea turtles contribute to the health of the ocean emphasizes this point: “When you kill one turtle, it affects several other aspects of the ocean. Sea turtles feed on jellyfish, keeping their population in check, which in turn supports fish populations. They also feed on sponges, which helps maintain coral reefs. If turtles disappear, the entire marine ecosystem could collapse.”

Despite their critical role in the ecosystem, sea turtles continue to be targeted, not just for their meat but also for their shells, which are “illegally sold and transported to neighboring countries like Togo and Ivory Coast,” he disclosed.

“Poaching happens in all the communities in Ghana where turtles nest, even in protected areas,” says Dr. Agyekumhene underscoring the widespread nature of the threat.

“The fishers know it’s illegal, so they often sell the turtles secretly to fishmongers who smoke the meat and sell it in the market.”

Laws and enforcement: A struggle to protect the vulnerable

Ghana is a signatory to several international agreements that protect sea turtles, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS).

Ghana’s Wildlife Conservation Regulations Bill of 1971 (LI 685) classifies sea turtles as a Schedule 1 species, granting them full protection. This means it is illegal to capture, possess, or sell any part of a sea turtle, whether in the water or on nesting beaches, Dr. Agyekumhene explained.

However, the reality on the ground tells a different story as Essien’s open trading shows, enforcement of these laws is often lacking.

Vivian Addo, manager of the Muni-Pomadze Ramsar site under Ghana’s Wildlife Division, is one of the officials tasked with protecting these endangered species. She acknowledges the difficulties in enforcing the law, especially in coastal communities like Nyanyano, where illegal poaching is rampant.

“We’ve arrested people for poaching sea turtles before,” she told journalist Gideon Sarpong. “But it’s difficult to sustain these efforts without adequate time and logistics. We’ve been aware of the poaching in Nyanyano for months, but we haven’t been able to act on it due to lack of resources.”

Despite clear evidence of illegal poaching provided to her team during this investigation, no arrests have been made. Vivian’s frustration is palpable. “These are first-schedule animals. We should be prosecuting offenders, but without support, it’s hard to make a lasting impact,” she argued.

The challenge of enforcement, coupled with the economic realities of fishing communities, creates a perfect storm for the continued decline of sea turtles in Ghana. While officials like Vivian strive to uphold the law, traders like Essien, and the fishers who supply him, continue to operate with little fear of repercussions.

The 2020 report by the IUCN/SSC Marine Turtle Specialist Group reinforces the lack of action by Ghanaian authorities, noting that “regulation is rarely enforced beyond coastal communities that contain a Wildlife Division field office.”

The gap between legislation and enforcement leaves sea turtles in a vulnerable position, caught between survival and extinction.

The future of Ghana’s sea turtles

As the sun sets on the beaches of Nyanyano, the future of Ghana’s sea turtles remains uncertain. Dr. Agyekumhene remains hopeful that continuous community-based interventions can eventually turn the tide in favor of conservation. But without significant intervention, the outlook is grim.

So far, community driven projects by groups like the Environmental Justice Foundation, Ghana Turtle Conservation Project, Meridian Port Services geared towards protecting sea turtles offer a glimmer of hope.

“The future of our oceans depends on these creatures,” Dr. Agyekumhene warns. “If we lose the sea turtles, we risk losing everything else. It’s not just about them—it’s about the entire ecosystem.”

For now, the battle continues, with dedicated conservationists, struggling fishers, and illegal traders locked in a complex and fragile dance.

The survival of Ghana’s sea turtles, and the health of its coastal waters, hang in the balance, caught between the pressures of economic survival and the desperate need for environmental protection.

—-

This investigation is part of the Pulitzer Ocean Reporting Network Fellowship. Reporting and writing by Gideon Sarpong.

The post The vanishing guardians of Ghana’s oceans: Exposing the sea turtle poaching crisis appeared first on iWatch Africa.

iWatch Africa with support from Impact Amplifier Foundation, is equipping and assisting 20 journalists from twenty newsrooms in Ghana to set up online safety units in response to the growing online violence experienced by journalists, particularly female journalists.

This project is a sequel to iWatch Africa’s digital rights initiative launched in 2020 to track, document and analyze threats against journalists, media workers within the digital ecosystem in West Africa.

Eligibility:
Applicants are expected to be:
• Ghanaian nationals aged between 18 and 45 years old, and must be prepared to influence change in their newsroom or organization.
• Must be a journalist or work within the media ecosystem.
• People or activists who directly contribute to media development programs in Ghana.

NOTE: Female journalists are strongly encouraged to apply.

Requirements:
All selected applicants will be MANDATED to introduce a protocol on dealing with online abuse and harassment of journalists in their organization after the program.
Applicants should follow our social media handles: Twitter: @iwatchafrica for updates.
Important Dates:
• Deadline for applications:  18th May 2024; 11: 00pm GMT. Applicants will also be selected on rolling basis.
• All selected applicants will be contacted by 23rd May, 2024.

The post Call for applications: Empowering newsrooms & journalists to counter online abuse appeared first on iWatch Africa.

Application deadline: April 21, 2024 at 11:59 p.m. GMT

iWatch Africa

iWatch Africa is a non-governmental media and policy organization focused on transparency and accountability based in Ghana. We are focused on media development initiatives including tracking and reporting on digital rights, trans-national organized crime, Illicit Financial Flows, human rights abuse, climate change and environmental abuses in Africa. We are part of Thomson Reuters Foundation’s 3-year project on Illicit Financial Flows in Africa, focusing on Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Mozambique and Ghana.

About the Thomson Reuters Foundation

The Thomson Reuters Foundation is the charitable arm of Thomson Reuters, a global provider of independent international news and information. As an independent charity, registered in the UK and US, we work to advance media freedom, foster more inclusive economies and promote human rights. And through news, media development, free legal assistance and advocacy initiatives, we combine our media and legal services to drive systemic change.

We are accepting applications on a rolling basis, please apply as soon as possible.

With financial support from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), iWatch Africa and Thomson Reuters Foundation is seeking Ghana journalists motivated to understand how their country and/or other countries of the African continent could lose money illicitly. This training objective is to find Africa’s missing billions, lost to illicit financial flows (IFF) through investigative reporting.

The program is a long-term commitment and journalists participating in the program must sign an agreement that commits them to the following elements of the training program:

• Intensive training on illicit financing reporting.

• The first workshop will take place from Monday, 29th April to Friday 3rd May 2024 (5 days) in Accra.

• A second workshop will take place a few weeks after the first training in Accra – TBD.

Participants selected for the program will:

• Produce and publish one or more articles on illicit financial flows.

• Receive mentoring and editorial support to help them produce the story/stories.

Journalists will not be considered to have completed the program until they have completed all elements of the program, including the production of at least one article on illicit financial flows. They will also not be able to receive their certificates before this stage.

PROGRAM BENEFITS

• If selected, you will participate in two intensive workshops covering illicit finance, business investigations, accounts and budgets, and investigative techniques. The workshops will take place in Accra.

• You will propose one or more story ideas that you would like to work on as part of the program and if you are selected, we will provide you with experienced journalists to help you produce your stories through to publication/broadcast.

• If you are selected, you will receive modest funding to help you realize your stories.

• You will have exclusive access to the expertise of our network of illicit financing experts.

• You will also have access to story ideas and editorial advice and will be invited to share your own expertise with other participants.

Successful applicants will receive full sponsorship which will cover accommodation and meals.

Who Can Apply

Application deadline: April 20, 2024 at 11:59 p.m. GMT.

We are accepting applications on a rolling basis, please apply as soon as possible.

Interested journalists should provide:

• A link to a sample of your work (copy of published articles, if links are not available).

• If your sample is published in the local language, please provide us with an English translation (if the link is online, please share it so the web page can be translated).

• A letter from your editor consenting to your participation in the program and confirming that they will publish your story produced under the program. If you are a freelancer, please provide us with a commitment from your media outlet confirming that your story will be published.

• For example, the letter should say “I confirm that we will publish the story produced under the program.”

• If the letter from your editor or press organization does not explicitly state this, we will not be able to consider your application.

Please prepare all your documents before starting the application.

Please note that acceptance to the program does not mean that your story proposal has been approved. If you are accepted, the story proposal will be reviewed by our editorial team before approval.

Click on the link below to apply:

https://forms.gle/KwhSxFs1faAHwnbL9

If you have difficulty applying, please email info@iwatchafrica.org with the subject: ‘Ghana IFFs Training Program 2024’ – We cannot guarantee a rapid response if this subject is not mentioned.

The post iWatch Africa call for applications: illicit finance training – Accra appeared first on iWatch Africa.

Terms of Reference:

Working Together to Curb Illicit Financial Flows from Sub-Saharan Africa Project

Introduction

iWatch Africa

iWatch Africa is a non-governmental media and policy organization based in Ghana. We are focused on media development initiatives including tracking and reporting on digital rights, trans-national organized crime, Illicit Financial Flows, human rights abuse, climate change and environmental abuses in Africa. We are part of Thomson Reuters Foundation’s 3-year project on Illicit Financial Flows in Africa, focusing on Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Mozambique and Ghana.

Thomson Reuters Foundation

Thomson Reuters Foundation, the charitable arm of Thomson Reuters, champions media freedom, inclusive economies, and human rights globally. Registered in the UK and USA, we drive systemic change through news, legal assistance, and convening initiatives. Currently, we’re leading a 3-year project on Illicit Financial Flows in Africa, focusing on Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Mozambique and Ghana.

Background

Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) denote the illicit transfer of funds across borders, encompassing actions deemed illegal, unethical, or harmful to the economies and societies involved. These activities encompass tax evasion, money laundering, corruption, and illicit trade, all of which yield severe economic, social, and political repercussions for both developed and developing nations.

Pinpointing the exact scale of IFFs proves challenging due to their clandestine nature. Nonetheless, estimates from entities like Global Financial Integrity (GFI) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) suggest annual losses amounting to trillions of dollars due to IFFs. Developing countries bear a disproportionate burden, with illicit outflows often surpassing official development assistance and foreign direct investment.

In contrast to developed nations, where income tax stands as a primary revenue source, developing countries heavily rely on trade-related taxes. Despite the establishment of initiatives like the East Africa Community (EAC) Customs Union and Trade Protocol in 2005 to bolster intra-regional trade and enhance member countries’ productive capacities through trade agreements and tariff schedules, recent research by the Anti-Corruption Evidence initiative (ACE) reveals a significant rise in rent-seeking behavior over the past 15 years. This surge, attributed to trade misinvoicing and smuggling, results in substantial revenue losses. Notably, GFI estimates indicate that trade misinvoicing alone accounts for two-thirds of all IFFs, totaling $600-900 billion for developing countries annually. Tariff evasion, while a global issue, exacerbates in nations struggling with enforcement of tariff rates and customs regulations, leading importing firms to engage in trade misinvoicing to evade tariffs or move capital abroad.

For instance, in Ghana, Illicit Financial Flows show its face through money laundering, tax evasion, under-invoicing, internet fraud, the extractive industry, fishing industry, forex market imports and the real estate sector.

In 2019, the Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) reported that an audit of Customs Management Systems discovered that about 1.8 billion dollars had been transferred outside the country. With regards to exports, EOCO with support from the Precious Minerals Marketing Commission (PMMC) examined about 10 gold companies for the period of 2018 to 2020 and from these 10 companies, it was noticed that about 1.1 billion dollars’ worth of gold was transferred outside the country.

Given this context, iWatch Africa with support from the Thomson Reuters Foundation (TRF), intends to provide training for journalists. The goal is to empower journalists with the necessary skills to craft stories that expose concealed financial activities, raise public consciousness, and aid in the fight against corruption, tax evasion, and other types of financial misconduct that hinder sustainable development in Tanzania.

Objective

iWatch Africa and TRF advocate for journalists to possess comprehensive knowledge of IFFs. Equipping journalists with the skills to investigate and report on these matters ensures that the public gains awareness of how these practices deplete resources and hinder development. Journalists will consequently assume a crucial role in ensuring accountability for governments, corporations, and individuals engaged in IFFs.

Scope of work

1. Investigative Journalism: Techniques and Practices
2. Building and Pitching Your Investigation: Strategies for Effective Communication
3. Planning and Sourcing: Developing a Comprehensive Approach
4. Sources and Searching: Methods for Gathering Information
5. Tax and DRM (Domestic Resource Mobilization): Understanding Current Trends
6. Review, Learning Points, Action Planning: Reflecting on Progress and Setting Goals
7. Tax Avoidance, Offshoring, and Tax Havens: Exploring Strategies and Consequences
8. Gender and Human Rights: Examining Intersectional Issues
9. Credibility, Accuracy, and Media Trust: Upholding Journalistic Integrity
10. Pitching Session: Presenting Your Investigation with Impact
11. Organizing and Protecting Data, Sources, and Self: Safeguarding Information and Security
12. Money Laundering: Uncovering Illicit Financial Activities
13. Legal Issues: Navigating the Legal Landscape of Investigative Journalism
14. Extractive Industries: Investigating the Impact and Practices
15. Review, Learning Points, Action Planning: Iterating Strategies for Improvement

Modality

An array of modalities will be employed to deliver comprehensive training sessions, incorporating dynamic PowerPoint presentations, interactive discussions, hands-on activities, multimedia demonstrations, case studies, role-playing exercises, and real-world simulations.

Targeted Audience

This capacity building session intends to strengthen the knowledge of 10 journalists in Ghana.

Duration

The training will be held in April, 18-19 2024 Accra, Ghana. After the training, the consultant will be provided with 10 working days to submit the training report before the final payment is made.

Expected outcomes.

Following the training, journalists who have undergone the program will need to produce

and disseminate thoroughly researched, influential articles concerning Illicit Financial

Flows (IFFs) across various media platforms. Equipped journalists will also be allowed to

partner with experts to improve their coverage of IFF practices.

How to Apply

1. Qualifications

We are seeking local trainers who demonstrate a strong background and expertise in their respective fields. To ensure the highest quality of candidates, applicants should meet the following qualifications:

2. Relevant Experience: Applicants should possess a proven track record in delivering training sessions or workshops related to Illicit Financial Flows. This should be reflected in their CVs and cover letters.
3. Recent Training Workshops: Applicants must provide details of the last two training workshops they conducted. This information should include the topics covered, the duration of the workshops, and the target audience. It should demonstrate the applicant’s ability to effectively plan, organize, and deliver training sessions.
4. Regional Work Experience: Preference will be given to candidates who have experience working within the region. Applicants should provide references to any work they have done in the region, highlighting their familiarity with local contexts, challenges, and opportunities.
5. Media/Professional Networks: Applicants should showcase their involvement in relevant media or professional networks within the region. This could include memberships, affiliations, or partnerships with organizations, associations, or groups related to the field of training.
6. Alumni Organizations: Candidates who are associated with alumni organizations related to education, training, or professional development are encouraged to highlight these affiliations in their application. Alumni networks can serve as valuable resources for networking, collaboration, and support.
7. Communication Skills: Strong communication skills, both written and verbal, are essential for effective training delivery. Applicants should demonstrate their ability to convey complex information clearly and engage with diverse audiences.
8. Adaptability: The ability to adapt training approaches to meet the needs of different audiences and learning styles is crucial. Applicants should provide examples of how they have tailored their training methods to accommodate various learning preferences and abilities.

8. Team Player: The ability to collaborate effectively with colleagues and stakeholders is essential. Applicants should demonstrate their capacity to work well within a team environment, contributing positively to group dynamics and achieving common goals.
9. Please provide us with your cv and a cover letter if interested.
10. All documents should be sent to info@iwatchafrica.org with the subject “Journalism Training Scheme” by 5th April, 2024. 

Only shorlisted applicants will be contacted. If you do not hear from us by the end of April, 2024 then your application was not successful. Thank you.

The post iWatch Africa Consultancy – Call for media trainers in Ghana appeared first on iWatch Africa.

DIBOMBARI, Cameroon — “We are going through hell,” the haunting words of Marie Noel resonate with a mix of despair and fortitude. Marie, an activist in her 50s hailing from the village of Souza near Dibombari Socapalm Plantation, paints a somber portrait of her community’s plight. Amidst the cruel grip of hardship, they’ve been driven to the brink, forced to scavenge “Socapalm fruits and nuts” in a desperate bid to quell their gnawing hunger.

In 2006, Société Camerounaise de Palmeraies (Socapalm), a subsidiary of plantation giant, Socfin, embarked on an ambitious endeavor – the cultivation of palm plantations within Dibombari’s lush rainforest expanse in Cameroon. Yet, beneath the veneer of progress lies a tapestry of troubling accusations. Allegations of forcible land displacement, pollution of vital water sources, the decimation of delicate ecosystems, and the sacrilegious intrusion into ancestral lands cast a dark shadow over the company’s operations.

A three-month investigation conducted by Gideon Sarpong and Robert Abunaw puts the spotlight on these unsettling truths. At the core of this narrative looms a protracted legal clash waged in French courts – Sherpa et al. vs Socfin. This ten-year legal drama, ostensibly conceived to quell the quagmire of land conflicts, ecological turmoil, and the cries of the aggrieved, paradoxically seems to amplify the existing travails of these marginalized communities. Thousands, bereft of their means of livelihood, have been forced into the murky realm of petty criminality within the very bowels of Socapalm’s sprawling plantations – a bitter struggle for survival in the face of adversity.

Marie Noel placed the blame squarely on the government of Cameroon and Socfin, accusing the state of leasing all their precious farmlands to the multinational plantation company, and its local subsidiaries.

In her words, this decision has left the neighboring villagers with “nothing, as all their lands have been locked up in a 60-year lease to Socapalm.”

Despite all the controversies, the Socapalm plantation site situated in Dibombari secured a Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) certification in 2022. This certification is widely considered a mark of sustainable and environmentally conscious production, indicating that the site adheres to the lowest possible environmental impact standards.

However, a review of a July 2023 EarthWorm Foundation (EF) report, commissioned by none other than Socfin, casts a long shadow over the company concerning its Dibombari operations. The report confirmed accusations of severe improprieties, including the denial of livelihoods and land displacements, sexual harassment of local communities, water pollution resulting in a lack of access to clean drinking water, and the encroachment of sacred sites by the company’s sprawling plantations.

These findings, which are consistent with our own reporting, raise significant concerns about the RSPO certification granted to Socapalm’s Dibombari site. With documented instances of several cases of abuse, many are left wondering how the company managed to obtain its RSPO certification despite seemingly falling short of meeting crucial international regulations.

Mr. Emmanuel Elong, the president of SYNAPARCAM, a Cameroonian association defending the indigenous rights of local communities, expressed deep bewilderment over the continued granting of RSPO certifications to Socapalm.

“In the face of overwhelming evidence of misconduct and questionable practices, there are mounting questions about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the RSPO certification process,” he argued.

In response to this investigation, RSPO contented that “Socapalm Dibombari’s operating unit underwent an audit by the independent third-party certification body, BSI Services Malaysia Sdn. Bhd, who granted certification.”

RSPO further explained that it has “reviewed the EF report against the audit conducted by BSI and will advise BSI to review and verify the findings of the EF investigation. At their discretion, BSI will further investigate/verify those reports/issues/allegations via an additional audit or during its annual surveillance audit.”

The implications of these findings shed light on the ongoing challenges faced by the affected communities, raising urgent questions about the responsibility of both corporate entities and the government to protect the rights and well-being of their citizens.

Laura Bourgeois, Advocacy and Litigation officer for Sherpa, an international NGO dedicated to advocacy and litigation, notes: “The recurring problems we hear from community leaders on the frontline is that community members, stakeholders, are not included in the process and that the certification initiatives make the problems even worse.”

A Decade of Legal Strife and Its Unfolding Impact

Socfin in August 2023 released an action plan to address the findings of Earthworm’s report.

However, considering the company’s track record in Cameroon, skepticism arises among many regarding their commitment to follow through on these claims.

A representative for Socapalm declined to comment on this investigation, pointing to information available on Socfin’s official website.

In 2013, Sherpa initiated mediation with Bolloré, the majority owner of Socfin, to find resolutions to the persistent issues plaguing the plantations and their surroundings. This dialogue culminated in an action plan, where Bolloré pledged to leverage their influence to tackle these problems.

Yet, despite the agreed-upon plan, Bolloré failed to fulfill its commitments, prompting Sherpa and other organizations to initiate legal proceedings against the French multinational. A decade-long courtroom saga ensued, adding a further layer of complexity to the challenges endured by communities ensnared in Socapalm’s operational embrace.

“The non-implementation of the action plan agreed upon in 2013 confirms it is an absolute necessity, when possible, to have mandatory legislation in the field of business and human rights,” asserts Laura Bourgeois. She adds: “Otherwise, soft mechanisms mean that communities remain dependent upon the goodwill of companies. When mandatory legislation does not seem like an option, it seems appropriate to consider legal avenues to harden soft law.”

This legal battle in the French courts to compel the execution of the action plan, and to ensure the delivery of promised remedies, has aggravated the already dire challenges faced by some communities within the operational sphere of Socapalm.

In Kilombo, a village that is situated at the heart of Socapalm Kienke plantation in Cameroon, Yengue Jean’s frustration with the company is palpable. She characterized the company as “irresponsible” and went on to reveal that a borehole, ostensibly installed to benefit the village, was “primarily utilized to irrigate the adjacent Socapalm nursery.”

Jean lamented, “The residents are now compelled to depend on a nearby stream tainted with pollutants,” while sorrowfully noting, “Our once thriving forests have vanished, leaving us without the vital resources to sustain our traditional hunting practices.”

Deforestation and the new European Union (EU) Law

Startling findings from Global Witness showcase the unsettling consequence of industrial palm and rubber plantations across the expanse of West and Central Africa, witnessing the loss of nearly 52,000 hectares of ecologically rainforest since the turn of the century—equivalent to an expanse 16 times the size of Brussels.

A 2021 study led by Cameroonian researcher Professor Tchindjang Mesmin also revealed that palm oil cultivation in the dense forest regions of Cameroon has emerged as the principal catalyst behind deforestation since the year 1990.

In a sharp critique, Mr. Elong blamed the government of Cameroon for its perceived failure to tackle crucial issues, alleging that the administration displays “worrisome indications of corruption,”, especially in the enforcement of retrocession agreements between Socfin and the State.

Cameroon’s Minister of Environment and Protection of Nature, Pierre Hélé did not respond to our requests for comment.

In June 2023, the EU introduced regulations on deforested products to address the challenge of rubber and oil plantation-driven deforestation,

The EU remains the biggest export destination for palm oil and rubber cultivation from West Africa. Data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity shows that the EU imported over $500 million worth of natural rubber from West Africa in 2020 making natural rubber the EU’s most significant import from West Africa in terms of rainforest destruction.

The effect has been the loss of critical rainforests, with a damning impact on local communities, biodiversity, and the environment.

Dr. Addo Koranteng, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Research Innovation and Development in Ghana lauded the EU’s legislative action against deforestation.

Nonetheless, his commendation is accompanied by a stark warning: “The expansion of rubber plantations must be halted as these rubber-producing trees compete with other forest trees for the already depleted forest land.”

Dr. Koranteng’s concerns are underscored by an inconvenient truth: “As world market prices surge and global demand exacerbate, the extent of deforestation from these commodities will keep on increasing,” he explained.

Recent research compounds the urgency of the situation. Estimates project a need for an astounding 4.3 to 8.5 million hectares of new plantations to meet the mounting demand for natural rubber by the year 2024. Experts are ringing alarm bells, cautioning that this trajectory, if left unchecked, will unleash a cataclysmic toll on precious forests around the world.

So far, our investigation has revealed a notable absence: Neither Socfin nor its Cameroon-based subsidiaries currently have made any commitment to the High Carbon Stock Approach (HCSA), the de-facto standard for zero deforestation in the sector.

Greenpeace has sounded a dire warning, asserting that Socfin’s steadfast refusal to adopt a zero-deforestation policy poses an ominous and substantial threat to the forests of Cameroon, within which the company operates.

Socfin did not respond to email inquiries seeking comment.

Way Forward

A decade-long saga of legal battles in French courts has so far yielded little solace for the numerous villagers residing in proximity to Socapalm plantations.

For these villagers whose ancestral lands have been lost to the expansive reach of Socapalm’s plantations, the passage of time has failed to bring about the restitution they so desperately seek.

“The plight we face is beyond words – a dire and miserable reality,” said villagers from Bikondo and Lendi.

There is however a glimmer of hope as legal practitioner, Agboranyor Jeniffer, with a wealth of expertise in Cameroon’s Common Law and Administrative Court, believes there might be a viable solution on the horizon.

Peering into the intricacies of Prime Ministerial Decree No. 2022/5074PM, she points out a potential avenue: the possibility of initiating legal action against the Government of Cameroon. She cites Section 2(3) of Law No. 2006/022, enacted on December 29, 2006, which lays down the framework for the organization and operation of administrative courts in Cameroon.

“Under this legal framework, the court’s jurisdiction extends to pivotal matters including, but not limited to; claims for compensation due to losses caused by administrative actions and disputes centered around state-owned land,” she explained.

Jeniffer’s analysis offers a flicker of optimism for those who have long grappled with the repercussions of Socapalm’s operations.

As the legal landscape continues to evolve, these insights may hold the potential to redress grievances, foster justice, and pave the way for meaningful change in the lives of the affected communities.

Reporting by Gideon Sarpong and Robert Abunaw. Writing and editing by Gideon Sarpong.

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In Ghana and Nigeria, ADRF’s support has seen iWatch Africa engage 20 newsrooms on online safety of women journalists. Leveraging the Keeping Journalists Safe Online: A Guide for Newsrooms in West Africa and Beyond, the newsrooms were supported to set up safety protocols and response measures to safeguard women journalists against abuse.

Through a multiplier model, journalists from the supported newsrooms (10 from Ghana and 10 from Nigeria) also underwent a Training of Trainers programme on the use of filtering applications such as TRFilter which helps document and manage online harassment and abuse. Furthemore, the participants discussed strategies through which journalists, government agencies and civil society could push back more effectively against online violence. The training facilitators included practitioners from Thomson Reuters Foundation; iWatch Africa; Techpreneur Magazine; The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ); and Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII).

The trained journalists have since gone on to train an additional 100 journalists within their networks. A further offshoot from the project was the formation of a discussion forum for networking, sharing experiences and lessons learned amongst the supported newsrooms.

The ADRF, an initiative of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has previously supported iWatch Africa to track, document and analyse online abuse and harassment against journalists and rights activists covering political and societal issues in Ghana. In partnership with the Ghana Police and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), iWatch Africa developed draft guidelines for the prevention of online abuse and harassment. The organisation has continued to undertake advocacy in the field while engaging stakeholders on offering legal support for victims to seek redress.

According to Gideon Sarpong, the Executive Director of iWatch Africa, ADRF’s support has helped raise awareness about the importance of protecting journalists and contributed to a safer media environment. “The cohort of journalists trained and their newsrooms could be the catalysts to curbing digital violence against women journalists in Ghana and Nigeria,” said Sarpong.

According to the State of Media Freedom and Safety of Journalists in Africa Report for 2022, trolling and online harassment of journalists has become a serious threat to press freedom. It notes that trolls threaten and silence critical journalists and harass many, particularly women, forcing some to abandon social media. (Xanax) According to the report, the low levels of digital security skills; poor reporting of online abuses to law enforcement agencies; the limited skills and interest of authorities in investigating and prosecuting cyber crimes; and the inadequacy of existing laws in tackling trolling and online violence especially against women, only exacerbate the problem.

The ADRF was established in recognition that technology had become pivotal to promoting livelihoods and human rights on the continent but there was a need to strengthen local capacity in evidence-based research, skills and knowledge, collaborative advocacy and impactful policy engagements responsive to regulatory and practice developments that affect internet freedom in Africa.

The ADRF’s supporters have included the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the Ford Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the German Society for International Cooperation Agency (GIZ), New Venture Fund (NVF) and the Omidyar Network.

Ashnah Kalemera | CIPESA

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• UN Comtrade data shows that the European Union exported over $275 million worth of vehicles to Ghana in the last five years. “Many of these vehicles are comparable to those we consider end-of-life vehicles.”

• With an estimated 40% of Accra’s air pollution concentrations related to vehicle transport emissions, Accra’s yearly concentration of air pollution was 11 times higher than the WHO air quality standard as of 2020.

• Ghana’s local regulators; the Ghana Road Safety Authority, and the Ghana Standards Authority do not currently have any scientific specifications and emissions standards for auto spare parts exported to the country.

ACCRA, Ghana — In the bustling market of Abossey Okai in Accra, Ghana, one will find a vast array of imported auto parts from Europe and other parts of the world. The market is known for its wide variety of auto spare parts, including both new and used parts, and is a popular destination for those looking to repair or upgrade their vehicles.

However, the importation of end-of-life vehicles and used auto parts from Europe to the market is not only putting lives at risk but also contributing to significant environmental pollution in Ghana.

Robert Dumevo, a mechanic who runs his shop at Lapaz, a suburb of Accra, recounts how he narrowly escaped death on the N1 motorway in Accra. He had replaced a broken exhaust pipe on a client’s Hyundai Sonata, unaware that the replaced part was also faulty and resulted in the vehicle catching fire during a test drive.

“I was driving a ticking time bomb. My lungs were engulfed in smoke, and I struggled to breathe. I realized there was trouble when I tried to escape but my seat belt got jammed. I could feel the fire under my feet,” Robert recalled with some hint of trepidation.

Robert blames “unscrupulous spare part dealers” at Abossey Okai, Accra’s largest hub of spare parts importers, where he bought the replacement part.

“When you buy a used spare part at Abossey Okai, you cannot tell if it is fake, sub-standard, or faulty. Some businessmen are involved in the selling of sub-standard spare parts making it difficult to do our work,” he explained. (https://jardinefoods.com/)

Abossey Okai – A morgue for used car parts and end-of-life (ELVs) vehicles from Europe

Clement Boateng, the chairman of the Abossey Okai Spare Parts Dealers Association, admitted that the prevalence of sub-standard auto parts ending up in vehicles and causing safety and environmental issues stems from the nature of auto parts imported from abroad. “Most of the second-hand auto parts dealers import parts from salvaged and end-of-life vehicles,” Clement revealed.

There are “over 15,000 shops” at Abossey Okai, with over fifty-five percent engaged in the import of used auto spare parts from abroad, he said adding, “when importing used auto parts, you must be there for physical inspection or have a trusted client. Otherwise, you will stay in Ghana, and they will load a thrash of auto parts containers to you.”

The used automobile parts and vehicle industry is one of the biggest in Europe and West Africa. Data provided by the Dutch Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT), shows that “Europe exports over a million light-duty vehicles” to Africa annually. UN Comtrade data shows that the European Union has exported over $275 million worth of vehicles to Ghana in the last five years with Germany being the biggest exporter.

“Many of these vehicles are comparable to those we consider end-of-life vehicles,” ILT notes, bringing into question the nature of port inspections that take place in Europe before export.

Frank Duru, is a car exporter with several years of experience based in Germany. He explained that there are instances when an official car inspection before export is replaced by a personal glance of approval.

“A few of them [vehicles] do not have the roadworthiness certificate, but we see they are in good condition,” he disclosed.

“Neither the exporting nor importing countries have minimum requirements in place to ensure that only quality used vehicles are traded,” said Veronica Ruiz Stannah, an expert on transportation at the United Nations Environment Programme.

This allows for a lot of used cars and car parts in poor conditions to pass inspections at European harbors and depart for West Africa, where they create substantial safety, environmental and health problems for people like Robert.

Response to trade of ELVs and used spare parts in Europe and Ghana

In 2020, ILT conducted a study on the European export of used vehicles to West Africa. The study revealed that 80 percent of 280,000 vehicles exported to West Africa from the Netherlands were “old and below the Euro 4/IV emission standard,” and often lacked requisite “roadworthiness certification.”

The study also noted that the trend was not entirely different among other European markets such as Germany, Belgium and France, Netherlands, and Italy.

Marietta Harjono, a coordinating specialist at the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT) of the Netherlands, explained that, at the harbours, inspectors can stop the “worst vehicles, when they are waste or hazardous waste,” after conducting checks with customs officials.

She however stressed that, while a lot of the used cars may not be categorized as waste, they might still not be appropriate for export.

ILT in a 2021 proposal to the European Commission (EC) on the revision of EU regulation on end-of-life vehicles concluded that “environmental and health problems will arise in case third countries lack a proper system for handling vehicles that reach their end-of-life situation and become waste.”

The European Commission is currently in the process of revising its directive on end-of-life vehicles (ELVs), but it remains uncertain if a “cross-border aspect” will be included in the final regulation to end the export of  ELVs to places like Ghana and Nigeria according to the ILT.

The EC did not respond to questions about ELVs and used spare parts ending up in places like Ghana.

Despite the health and environmental problems caused by end-of-life automobile parts and vehicles from Europe, Ghana’s local regulators; the Ghana Road Safety Authority, and the Ghana Standards Authority do not currently have any scientific specifications and emissions standards for auto spare parts exported to the country.

Head of Regulation, Inspection, and Compliance at the Ghana Road Safety Authority, Kwame Koduah Atuahene told iWatch Africa that his authority and the Ghana Standards Authority (GSA) are engaged in a conversation “to ensure that spare parts imports at least meet some conformity test and standards.”

The Ghana Standards Authority in a written response as part of this investigation also noted that: “The GSA does not have a written policy specific to vehicle spare parts. The Authority is currently pursuing the development of national standards for replacement parts (spare parts).”

Meanwhile, in 2002, Ghana introduced a regulation that made the import of vehicles over ten years more costly by imposing penalties.

Emissions, Health and Environmental Problems

In spite of this regulation, it is typical to encounter many cars releasing thick exhaust fumes while driving through Ghana’s capital, Accra, – a health hazard for many pedestrians, street hawkers, and shop owners resulting in thousands of deaths annually.

Accra’s air pollution is considered critical as around 16 percent of the air is severely polluted and unhealthy, with an additional 30 percent unhealthy for sensitive groups, such as people with asthma according to the Air Quality Index.

At an event to mark the International Day of Clean Air Blue Skies last September, Dr. Francis Chisaka Kasolo, the World Health Organisation Representative to Ghana noted that air pollution was the biggest environmental risk responsible for premature deaths from heart attacks, stroke, and respiratory diseases in the country.

With an estimated 40% of Accra’s air pollution concentrations related to vehicle transport emissions, its yearly concentration of air pollution was 11 times higher than the WHO air quality standard as of 2020.

The country imports about 100,000 vehicles per year, 90 percent of which are used vehicles.  Most of the cars currently used in Ghana are Euro 1 and 2, meaning that they are the most pollutant according to the EU emission standards.

So far, officials in Ghana have failed to implement legislation passed in 2020 that aims to completely ban the import of vehicles older than 10 years.

Daniel Essel, Deputy Director at the Ministry of Transport in Ghana, during a session at COP27, praised the legislation but failed to mention that the government had chosen not to implement it, raising issues about commitment of Ghanaian officials to addressing concerns related to ELVs and used car parts.

“Policymakers in Ghana are not doing enough to curtail used vehicle consumption and, to that end, reduce the harms – crashes, pollution, etc. – that come with it,” says Festival Godwin Boateng, a Ph.D. researcher at the Center for Sustainable Urban Development at Columbia Climate School in New York.

Way Forward

To safeguard the environment and public safety, Dr. Boateng insists that any ban on ELVs in Ghana should be couched as part of broader policies such as investments to make public transport, walking and cycling cleaner, safer and affordable as well as investments in city planning and minibus electrification.

For a regional solution, the ILT recommends that “African governments agree as much as possible to harmonised or regional import standards for used vehicles. Whether it is on maximum age, minimum euro class, maximum mileage, proof of roadworthiness and or condition of the vehicles at export.”

Robert narrowly avoided a fatal outcome but unfortunately, thousands including the environment bear the consequences of years of ineffective policies on the import of ELVs and used car parts.

Until the necessary actions are taken, Robert believes that “many people will continue to perish each year” through no fault of their own.

Report by Gideon Sarpong, Additional reporting by Raluca Besliu, Daniel Abugre Anyorigya and Elfredah Kevin-Alerechi.

This investigation was supported by Journalismfund.eu.

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Online harassment of journalists in Ghana and Nigeria is a phenomenon that has prompted growing concern in recent years. Journalists who report on contested social and political issues increasingly find themselves the target of abuse through social media and other online means, in some cases including violent threats of death and rape.

Women journalists and right activists face an additional burden in that they are also attacked purely on the basis of their gender.

The initiative which is the second phase of iWatch’s digital rights initiative will assist twenty newsrooms in Ghana and Nigeria develop online safety units to tackle the evolving threat against journalists within the online ecosystem.

Gideon Sarpong, project lead for the initiative and co-founder of iWatch Africa, indicated that in 2020 alone, iWatch Africa “tracked over 5000 instances of online abuse” directed towards journalists and rights activists in Ghana.

“A 2021 UNESCO survey of 714 journalists also revealed that 73% of women journalists have experienced online violence, with chilling psychological effect and self-censorship” he added.

“The initiative will include designing reporting protocols for the participating news organisations and a digital campaign to deal with the real threat facing journalism today, which has the potential to erode press freedom in West Africa if it goes unchecked,” he stated.

Expected to last until the end of the year, the initiative will leverage on work (Guideline to protect journalists online) produced by Gideon Sarpong as a Reuters Fellow at University of Oxford.

The project is supported by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), through the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF).

Interested media representatives can send an email to info@iwatchafrica.org.

Credit: iWatch Africa

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